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Abstract
To enable high-performance and scalable blockchains, we need to step away from traditional
consensus-based fully-replicated designs. One direction is to explore the usage of sharding in
which we partition the managed dataset over many shards that—independently—operate as
blockchains. Sharding requires an efficient fault-tolerant primitive for the ordering and execution
of multi-shard transactions, however.
In this work, we seek to design such a primitive suitable for distributed ledger networks
with high transaction throughput. To do so, we propose Cerberus, a set of minimalistic
primitives for processing single-shard and multi-shard UTXO-like transactions. Cerberus aims
at maximizing parallel processing at shards while minimizing coordination within and between
shards. First, we propose Core-Cerberus, that uses strict environmental requirements to enable
simple yet powerful multi-shard transaction processing. In our intended UTXO-environment,
Core-Cerberus will operate perfectly with respect to all transactions proposed and approved
by well-behaved clients, but does not provide any guarantees for other transactions.
To also support more general-purpose environments, we propose two generalizations of Core-
Cerberus: we propose Optimistic-Cerberus, a protocol that does not require any additional
coordination phases in the well-behaved optimistic case, while requiring intricate coordination
when recovering from attacks; and we propose Pessimistic-Cerberus, a protocol that adds
sufficient coordination to the well-behaved case of Core-Cerberus, allowing it to operate in a
general-purpose fault-tolerant environments without significant costs to recover from attacks.
Finally, we compare the three protocols, showing their potential scalability and high transaction
throughput in practical environments.
1 Introduction
The advent of blockchain applications and technology has rejuvenated interest of companies, gov-
ernments, and developers in resilient distributed fully-replicated systems and the distributed ledger
technology (DLT) that powers them. Indeed, in the last decade we have seen a surge of interest in
reimagining systems and build them using DLT networks. Examples can be found in the financial
and banking sector [15, 36, 47], IoT [41], health care [28, 37], supply chain tracking, advertising,
and in databases [3, 5, 23, 44, 45]. This wide interest is easily explained, as blockchains promise to
improve resilience, while enabling the federated management of data by many participants.
To illustrate this, we look at the financial sector. Current traditional banking infrastructure
is often rigid, slow, and creates substantial frictional costs. It is estimated that the yearly cost
of transactional friction alone is $71 billion [8] in the financial sector, creating a strong desire for
alternatives. This sector is a perfect match for DLT, as it enables systems that manage digital assets
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Figure 1: A sharded design in which two resilient blockchains each hold only a part of the data. Local
decisions within a cluster are made via traditional Pbft consensus, whereas multi-shard transactions
are processed via Cerberus (proposed in this work).
and financial transactions in more flexible, fast, and open federated infrastructures that eliminate the
friction caused by individual private databases maintained by banks and financial services providers.
Consequently, it is expected that a large part of the financial sector will move towards DLT [18].
At the core of DLT is the replicated state maintained by the network in the form of a ledger of
transactions. In traditional blockchains, this ledger is fully replicated among all participants using
consensus protocols [14, 35, 41, 43]. For many practical use-cases, one can choose to use either
permissionless consensus solutions that are operated via economic self-incentivization through cryp-
tocurrencies (e.g., Nakamoto consensus [42, 51]), or permissioned consensus solutions that require
vetted participation (e.g, Pbft [16]). Unfortunately, the design of consensus protocols utilized by
todays DLT networks are severely limited in their ability to provide the high transaction throughput
that is needed to address practical needs, e.g., in the financial and banking sector.
On the one hand, we see that permissionless solutions can easily scale to thousands of participants,
but are severely limited in their transaction processing throughput. E.g., in Ethereum, a popular
public permissionless DLT platform, the rapid growth of decentralized finance applications [12] has
caused its network fees to rise precipitously as participants bid for limited network capacity [7],
while Bitcoin can only process a few transactions per second [47]. On the other hand, permissioned
solutions can reach much higher throughputs, but still lack scalability as their performance is bound
by the speed of individual participants.
In this paper, we focus on a fundamental solution to significantly increase the throughput of DLT
that may apply to either permissionless or permissioned networks. While this paper primarily discuss
this solution through the lens of permissioned networks, similar techniques apply to permissionless
DLT with the necessary extensions for these kinds of networks, such as self-incentivization, Sybil
attack protection, and tolerance of validator set churn. These kinds of permissionless networks are
the focus of Radix, and their impetus for their original creation of the Cerberus concept that this
paper will discuss.
A direction one can take to improve on the limited throughput of a DLT network, is to incorporate
sharding in their design: instead of operating a single fully-replicated consensus-based DLT network,
one can partition the data in the DLT network among several shards that each have the potential
to operate mostly-independent on their data, while only requiring cooperation between shards to
process transactions that affect data on several shards. In such a sharded design, transactions
that only affect objects within a single shard can be processed via normal consensus (e.g., Pbft).
Transactions that affect objects within several shards require additional coordination, however. The
choice of protocol for such multi-shard transaction processing determines greatly the scalability
benefits of sharding and the overhead costs incurred by sharding. We have sketched a basic sharded
design in Figure 1.
To provide multi-shard transaction processing with high throughput in practical environments
with a large number of shards, including permissionless networks, Radix proposed Cerberus—a
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technique for performing multi-shard transactions. In this paper, we propose and analyze a family
of multi-shard transaction processing protocol variants using the original Cerberus concept. To
be able to adapt to the needs of specific use-cases, we propose three variants of Cerberus: Core-
Cerberus, Optimistic-Cerberus, and Pessimistic-Cerberus.1
First, we propose Core-Cerberus (CCerberus), a design specialized for processing UTXO-like
transactions. CCerberus is a simplified variant of Cerberus, and uses the strict environmental
assumptions on UTXO-transactions to its advantage to yield a minimalistic design that does as little
work as possible per involved shard. Even with this minimalistic design, CCerberus will operate
perfectly with respect to all transactions proposed and approved by well-behaved clients (although
it may fail to process transactions originating from malicious clients).
Next, to also support more general-purpose environments, we propose two generalizations of
CCerberus, namely Optimistic-Cerberus and Pessimistic-Cerberus , that each deal with the
strict environmental assumptions of CCerberus, while preserving the minimalistic design of CCer-
berus. In the design of Optimistic-Cerberus (OCerberus), we assume that malicious behavior is
rare and we optimize the normal-case operations. We do so by keeping the normal-case operations
as minimalistic as possible. In specific, compared to CCerberus, OCerberus does not require
any additional coordination phases in the well-behaved optimistic case, while still being able to lift
the environmental assumptions of CCerberus. In doing so, OCerberus does require intricate
coordination when recovering from attacks. In the design of Pessimistic-Cerberus, we assume that
malicious behavior is common and we add sufficient coordination to the normal-case operations
of CCerberus to enable a simpler and localized recovery path, allowing PCerberus to recover
from attacks at lower cost, at the expense of increased complexity in normal-case operation. Both
variants we believe may be productive directions for consideration for different network deployment
situations depending on desired trade-offs.
To show the strengths of each of the Cerberus protocols, we show that Cerberus can provide
serializable transaction execution for UTXO-like transactions. Furthermore, we show that each
of the protocol variants have excellent scalability in practice, even when exclusively dealing with
multi-shard workloads.
Organization First, in Section 2, we present the terminology and notation used throughout this
paper. Then, in Section 3, we specify the correctness criteria by which we evaluate our Cerberus
multi-shard transaction processing protocols. Then, in Sections 4, 5, and 6, we present the three vari-
ants of Cerberus, namely Core-Cerberus (CCerberus), Optimistic-Cerberus (OCerberus),
and Pessimistic-Cerberus (PCerberus). In Section 7, we further analyze the practical strengths,
properties, and performance of Cerberus. Then, in Section 8, we discuss related work, while we
conclude on our findings in Section 9.
2 Preliminaries
Before we proceed with our detailed presentation of Cerberus, we first introduce the system model,
the sharding model, the data model, the transaction model, and the relevant terminology and
notation used throughout this paper.
Sharded fault-tolerant systems If S is a set of replicas, then we write G(S) to denote the
non-faulty good replicas in S that always operate as intended, and we write F(S) = S \ G(S) to
denote the remaining replicas in S that are faulty and can act Byzantine, deviate from the intended
operations, or even operate in coordinated malicious manners. We write nS = |S|, gS = |G(S)|, and
1The ideas underlying Cerberus was outlined in an earlier whitepaper of our Radix team available at
https://www.radixdlt.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Cerberus-Whitepaper-v1.0.pdf.
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fS = |S \ G(S)| = nS − gS to denote the number of replicas in S, good replicas in S, and faulty
replicas in S, respectively.
Let R be a set of replicas. In a sharded fault-tolerant system over R, the replicas are partitioned
into sets shards(R) = {S0, . . . ,Sz} such that the replicas in Si, 0 ≤ i ≤ z, operate as an independent
Byzantine fault-tolerant system. As each Si operates as an independent fault-tolerant system, we
require nSi > 3fSi , a minimal requirement to enable Byzantine fault-tolerance in an asynchronous
environment [20, 21]. We assume that every shard S ∈ shards(R) has a unique identifier id(S).
We assume asynchronous communication: messages can get lost, arrive with arbitrary delays,
and in arbitrary order. Consequently, it is impossible to distinguish between, on the one hand, a
replica that is malicious and does not send out messages, and, on the other hand, a replica that
does send out proposals that get lost in the network. As such, Cerberus can only provide progress
in periods of reliable bounded-delay communication during which all messages sent by good replicas
will arrive at their destination within some maximum delay [25, 27]. Further, we assume that
communication is authenticated : on receipt of a message m from replica r ∈ R, one can determine
that r did sent m if r ∈ G(R). Hence, faulty replicas are able to impersonate each other, but are
not able to impersonate good replicas. To provide authenticated communication under practical
assumptions, we can rely on cryptographic primitives such as message authentication codes, digital
signatures, or threshold signatures [38, 48].
Assumption 2.1. Let shards(R) be a sharded fault-tolerant system. We assume coordinating
adversaries that can—at will—choose and control any replica r ∈ S in any shard S ∈ shards(R)
as long as, for each shard S ′, the adversaries only control up to fS′ replicas in S ′.
Object-dataset model We use the object-dataset model in which data is modeled as a collection
of objects. Each object o has a unique identifier id(o) and a unique owner owner(o). In the following,
we assume that all owners are clients of the system that manages these objects. The only operations
that one can perform on an object are construction and destruction. An object cannot be recreated,
as the attempted recreation of an object o will result in a new object o′ with a distinct identifier
(id(o) 6= id(o′)).
Object-dataset transactions Changes to object-dataset data are made via transactions re-
quested by clients. We write 〈τ〉c to denote a transaction τ requested by a client c. We assume
that all transactions are UTXO-like transactions : a transaction τ first produces resources by de-
structing a set of input objects and then consumes these resources in the construction of a set
of output objects. We do not rely on the exact rules regarding the production and consumption
of resources, as they are highly application-specific. Given a transaction τ , we write Inputs(τ)
and Outputs(τ) to denote the input objects and output objects of τ , respectively, and we write
Objects(τ) = Inputs(τ) ∪ Outputs(τ).
Assumption 2.2. Given a transaction τ , we assume that one can determine Inputs(τ) and
Outputs(τ) a-priori. Furthermore, we assume that every transaction has inputs. Hence, |Inputs(τ)| ≥
1.
Owners of objects o can express their support for transactions τ that have o as their input. To
provide this functionality, we can rely on cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures [38].
Assumption 2.3. If an owner is well-behaved, then an expression of support cannot be forged or
provided by any other party. Furthermore, a well-behaved owner of o will only express its support
for a single transaction τ with o ∈ Inputs(τ), as only one transaction can consume the object o,
and the owner will only do so after the construction of o.
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Multi-shard transactions Let o be an object. We assume that there is a well-defined function
shard(o) that maps object o to the single shard S ∈ shards(R) that is responsible for maintaining
o. Given a transaction τ , we write
shards(τ) = {shard(o) | o ∈ Objects(τ)}
to denote the shards that are affected by τ . We say that τ is a single-shard transaction if |shards(τ)| =
1 and is a multi-shard transaction otherwise. We assume
Assumption 2.4. Let D(S) be the dataset maintained by shard S. We have o ∈ D(S) only if
shard(o) = S.
3 Correctness of multi-shard transaction processing
Before we introduce Cerberus, we put forward the correctness requirements we want to maintain
in a multi-shard transaction system in which each shard is itself a set of replicas operated as a
Byzantine fault-tolerant system. We say that a shard S performs an action if every good replica
in G(S) performs that action. Hence, any processing decision or execution step performed by S
requires the usage of a consensus protocol to coordinate the replicas in S:
Fault-tolerant primitives At the core of resilient systems are consensus protocols [14, 16, 40, 41]
that coordinate the operations of individual replicas in the system, e.g., a Byzantine fault-tolerant
system driven by Pbft [16] orHotStuff [53], or a crash fault-tolerant system driven by Paxos [40].
As these systems are fully-replicated, each replica holds exactly the same data, which is determined
by the sequence of transactions—the journal—agreed upon via consensus:
Definition 3.1. A consensus protocol coordinate decision making among the replicas of a resilient
cluster S by providing a reliable ordered replication of decisions. To do so, consensus protocols
provide the following guarantees:
1. If good replica r ∈ S makes a ρ-th decision, then all good replicas r′ ∈ S will make a ρ-th
decision (whenever communication becomes reliable).
2. If good replicas r,q ∈ S make ρ-th decisions, then they make the same decisions.
3. Whenever a good replica learns that a decision D needs to be made, then it can force consensus
on D.
Let τ be a transaction processed by a sharded fault-tolerant system. Processing of τ does not
imply execution: the transaction could be invalid (e.g., the owners of affected objects did not express
their support) or the transaction could have inputs that no longer exists. We say that the system
commits to τ if it decides to apply the modifications prescribed by τ , and we say that the system
aborts τ if it decides to not do so. Using this terminology, we put forward the following requirements
for any sharded fault-tolerant system:
R1. Validity. The system must only processes transaction τ if, for every input object o ∈ Inputs(τ)
with a well-behaved owner owner(o), the owner owner(o) supports the transaction.
R2. Shard-involvement. The shard S only processes transaction τ if S ∈ shards(τ).
R3. Shard-applicability. Let D(S) be the dataset maintained by shard S at time t. The shards
shards(τ) only commit to execution of transaction τ at t if τ consumes only existing objects.
Hence, Inputs(τ) ⊆
⋃
{D(S) | S ∈ shards(τ)}.
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R4. Cross-shard-consistency. If shard S commits (aborts) transaction τ , then all shards S ′ ∈
shards(τ) eventually commit (abort) τ .
R5. Service. If client c is well-behaved and wants to request a valid transaction τ , then the sharded
system will eventually process 〈τ〉c. If τ is shard-applicable, then the sharded system will
eventually execute 〈τ〉c.
R6. Confirmation. If the system processes 〈τ〉c and c is well-behaved, then c will eventually learn
whether τ is committed or aborted.
We notice that shard-involvement is a local requirement, as individual shards can determine whether
they need to process a given transaction. In the same sense, shard-applicability and cross-shard-
consistency are global requirements, as assuring these requirements requires coordination between
the shards affected by a transaction.
4 Core-Cerberus: simple yet efficient transaction processing
The core idea of Cerberus is to minimize the coordination necessary for multi-shard ordering
and execution of transactions. To do so, Cerberus combines the semantics of transactions in the
object-dataset model with the minimal coordination required to assure shard-applicability and cross-
shard consistency. This combination results in the following high-level three-step approach towards
processing any transaction τ :
1. Local inputs. First, every affected shard S ∈ shards(τ) locally determines whether it has all
inputs from S that are necessary to process τ .
2. Cross-shard exchange. Then, every affected shard S ∈ shards(τ) exchanges these inputs to
all other shards in shards(τ), thereby pledging to use their local inputs in the execution of τ .
3. Decide outcome Finally, every affected shard S ∈ shards(τ) decides to commit τ if all affected
shards were able to provide all local inputs necessary for execution of τ .
Next, we describe how these three high-level steps are incorporated by Cerberus into normal
consensus steps at each shards. Let shard S ∈ shards(R) receive client request 〈τ〉c. The good
replicas in S will first determine whether τ is valid and applicable. If τ is not valid or S /∈ shards(τ),
then the good replicas discard τ . Otherwise, if τ is valid and S ∈ shards(τ), then the good replicas
utilize consensus to force the primary P(S) to propose in some consensus round ρ the message
m(S, τ)ρ = (〈τ〉c, I(S, τ), D(S, τ)), in which I(S, τ) = {o ∈ Inputs(τ) | S = shard(o)} is the set of
objects maintained by S that are input to τ and D(S, τ) ⊆ I(S, τ) is the set of currently-available
inputs at S. Only if I(S, τ) = D(S, τ) will S pledge to use the local inputs I(S, τ) in the execution
of τ .
The acceptance of m(S, τ)ρ in round ρ by all good replicas completes the local inputs step. Next,
during execution of τ , the cross-shard exchange and decide outcome steps are performed. First, the
cross-shard exchange step. In this step, S broadcasts m(S, τ)ρ to all other shards in shards(τ). To
assure that the broadcast arrives, we rely on a reliable primitive for cross-shard exchange, e.g., via
an efficient cluster-sending protocol [29, 32]. Then, the replicas in S wait until they receive messages
m(S ′, τ)ρ′ = (〈τ〉c, I(S ′, τ), D(S ′, τ)) from all other shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ).
After cross-shard exchange comes the final decide outcome step. After S receives m(S ′, τ)ρ′ from
all shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ), it decides to commit whenever I(S ′, τ) = D(S ′, τ) for all S ′ ∈ shards(τ).
Otherwise, it decides abort. If S decides commit, then all good replicas in S destruct all objects in
D(S, τ) and construct all objects o ∈ Outputs(τ) with S = shard(o). Finally, each good replica
informs c of the outcome of execution. If c receives, from every shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ), identical
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Figure 2: The message flow of CCerberus for a 3-shard client request 〈τ〉c that is committed.
outcomes from gS′′ − fS′′ distinct replicas in S ′′, then it considers τ to be successfully executed. In
Figure 2, we sketched the working of CCerberus.
The cross-shard exchange step of CCerberus at S involves waiting for other shards S ′. Hence,
there is the danger of deadlocks if the other shards S ′ never perform the cross-shard exchange step:
Example 4.1. Consider distinct transactions 〈τ1〉c1 and 〈τ2〉c2 that both affect objects o1 in S1
and o2 in S2. Hence, we have Inputs(τ1) = Inputs(τ2) = {o1, o2} and with shard(o1) = S1 and
shard(o2) = S2. We assume that S1 processes τ1 first and S2 processes τ2 first. Shard S1 will start
by sending m(S, τ1)ρ1 = (〈τ1〉c1 , {o1}, {o1}) to S2. Next, S1 will wait, during which it receives τ2.
At the same time, S2 follows similar steps for τ2 and sends m(S, τ2)ρ2 = (〈τ2〉c2 , {o2}, {o2}) to S1.
As a result, S1 is waiting for information on τ1 from S2, while S2 is waiting for information on τ2
from S1.
To assure that the above example does not lead to a deadlock, we employ two techniques.
1. Internal propagation. To deal with situations in which some shards S ∈ shards(τ) did not
receive 〈τ〉c (e.g., due to network failure or due to a faulty client that fails to send 〈τ〉c to
some shards), we allow each shard to learn τ from any other shard. In specific, any shard
S ∈ shards(τ) will start consensus on 〈τ〉c after receiving cross-shard exchange related to
〈τ〉c.
2. Concurrent resolution. To deal with concurrent transactions, as in Example 4.1, we allow each
shard to accept and execute transactions for different rounds concurrently. To assure that such
concurrent execution does not lead to inconsistent state updates, each replica implements the
following first-pledge and ordered-commit rules. Let τ be a transaction with S ∈ shards(τ)
and r ∈ S. The first-pledge rule states that S pledges o, constructed in round ρ, to transaction
τ only if τ is the first transaction proposed after round ρ with o ∈ Inputs(τ). The ordered-
commit rule states that S can abort τ in any order, but will only commit τ that is accepted
in round ρ after previous rounds finished execution.
Next, we apply the above two techniques to the situation of Example 4.1:
Example 4.2. While S1 is waiting for τ1, it received cross-shard exchange related to 〈τ2〉c2 . Hence,
in a future round ρ′1 > ρ1, it can propose and accept 〈τ2〉c2 . By the first-pledge rule, S1 already pledged
o1 to the execution of τ1. Hence, it cannot pledge any objects to the execution of τ2. Consequently,
S1 will eventually be able to send m(S1, τ2)ρ′
1
= (〈τ2〉c2 , {o1}, ∅) to S2. Likewise, S2 will eventually
be able to send m(S2, τ1)ρ′
2
= (〈τ1〉c1 , {o2}, ∅) to S1. Consequently, both shards decide abort on τ1
and τ2, which they can do in any order due to the ordered-commit rule.
Finally, we notice that abort decisions at shard S on a transaction τ can often be made with-
out waiting for all shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ). Shard S can decide abort after it detects I(S, τ) 6=
D(S, τ) or after it receives the first message (〈τ〉c, I(S ′′, τ), D(S ′′, τ)) with I(S ′′, τ) 6= D(S ′′, τ),
S ′′ ∈ shards(τ). For efficiency, we allow S to abort in these cases.
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Theorem 4.3. If, for all shards S∗, gS∗ > 2fS∗, and Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 hold, then
Core-Cerberus satisfies Requirements R1–R6 with respect to all transactions that are not requested
by malicious clients and that do not involve objects with malicious owners.
Proof. Let τ be a transaction. As good replicas in S discard τ if it is invalid or if S /∈ shards(τ),
CCerberus provides validity and shard-involvement. Next, shard-applicability follow directly from
the decide outcome step.
If a shard S commits or aborts transaction τ , then it must have completed the decide outcome
and cross-shard exchange steps. As S completed cross-shard exchange, all shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ)
must have exchanged the necessary information to S. By relying on cluster-sending for cross-shard
exchange, S ′ requires cooperation of all good replicas in S ′ to exchange the necessary information
to S. Hence, we have the guarantee that these good replicas will also perform cross-shard exchange
to any other shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ). As such, every shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ) will receive the same
information as S, complete cross-shard exchange, and make the same decision during the decide
outcome step, providing cross-shard consistency.
Finally, due to internal propagation and concurrent resolution, every valid transaction τ will be
processed by CCerberus as soon as it is send to any shard S ∈ shards(τ). Hence, every shard
in shards(τ) will perform the necessary steps to eventually inform the client. As all good replicas
r ∈ S, S ∈ shards(τ), will inform the client of the outcome for τ , the majority of these inform-
messages come from good replicas, enabling the client to reliably derive the true outcome. Hence,
CCerberus provides service and confirmation.
Notice that in the object-dataset model in which we operate, each object can be constructed
once and destructed once. Hence, each object o can be part of at-most two committed transactions:
the first of which will construct o as an output, and the second of which has o as an input and
will consume and destruct o. This is independent of any other operations on other objects. As
such these two transactions cannot happen concurrently. Consequently, we only have concurrent
transactions on o if the owner owner(o) expresses support for several transactions that have o as an
input. By Assumption 2.3, the owner owner(o) must be malicious in that case. As such, transactions
of well-behaved clients and owners will never abort.
In the design of CCerberus, we take advantage of this observation that aborts are always due to
malicious behavior by clients and owners of objects: to minimize coordination while allowing graceful
resolution of concurrent transactions, we do not undo any pledges of objects to the execution of any
transactions. This implies that objects that are involved in malicious transactions can get lost for
future usage, while not affecting any transactions of well-behaved clients.
5 Optimistic-Cerberus: robust transaction processing
In the previous section, we introduced CCerberus, a minimalistic and efficient multi-shard transac-
tion processing protocol that relies on practical properties of UTXO-like transactions. Although the
design of CCerberus is simple yet effective, we see two shortcomings that limits its use cases. First,
CCerberus operates under the assumption that any issues arising from concurrent transactions is
due to malicious behavior of clients. As such, CCerberus chooses to lock out objects affected by
such malicious behavior for any future usage. Second, CCerberus requires consecutive consensus
and cluster-sending steps, which increases its transaction processing latencies. Next, we investigate
how to deal with these weaknesses of CCerberus without giving up on the minimalistic nature of
CCerberus.
To do so, we propose Optimistic-Cerberus (OCerberus), which is optimized for the optimistic
case in which we have no concurrent transactions, while providing a recovery path that can recover
from concurrent transactions without locking out objects. At the core of OCerberus is assuring
that any issues due to malicious behavior, e.g., concurrent transactions, are detected in such a
8
way that individual replicas can start a recovery process. At the same time, we want to minimize
transaction processing latencies. To bridge between these two objectives, we integrate detection and
cross-shard coordination within a single consensus round that runs at each affected shard.
Let 〈τ〉c be a multi-shard transaction, let S ∈ shards(τ) be a shard with primary P(S), and
let m(S, τ)v,ρ be the round-ρ proposal of P(S) of view v of S. To enable detection of concurrent
transactions, OCerberus modifies the consensus-steps of the underlying consensus protocol by
applying the following high-level idea:
A replica r ∈ S, S ∈ shards(τ), only accepts proposalm(S, τ)v,ρ = (〈τ〉c, I(S, τ), D(S, τ))
for some transaction τ if it gets confirmation that replicas in each other shard S ′ ∈
shards(τ) are also accepting proposals for τ . Otherwise, replica r detects failure.
Next, we illustrate how to integrate the above idea in the three-phase design of Pbft, thereby
turning Pbft into a multi-shard aware consensus protocol:
1. Global preprepare. Primary P(S) must send m(S, τ)v,ρ to all replicas r′ ∈ S ′, S ′ ∈ shards(τ).
Replica r ∈ S only finishes the global preprepare phase after it receives a global preprepare
certificate consisting of a set M = {m(S ′′, τ)v′′,ρ′′ | S ′′ ∈ shards(τ)} of preprepare messages
from all primaries of shards affected by τ .
2. Global prepare. After r ∈ S, S ∈ shards(τ), finishes the global preprepare phase, it sends
prepare messages for M to all other replicas in r′ ∈ S ′, S ′ ∈ shards(τ). Replica r ∈ S only
finishes the global prepare phase for M after, for every shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ), it receives a
local prepare certificate consisting of a set P (S ′) of prepare messages for M from gS′ distinct
replicas in S ′. We call the set {P (S ′′) | S ′′ ∈ shards(τ)} a global prepare certificate.
3. Global commit. After replica r ∈ S, S ∈ shards(τ), finishes the global prepare phase, it sends
commit messages for M to all other replicas in r′ ∈ S ′, S ′ ∈ shards(τ). Replica r ∈ S only
finishes the global commit phase for M after, for every shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ), it receives a
local commit certificate consisting of a set C(S ′) of commit messages for M from gS′ distinct
replicas in S ′. We call the set {P (S ′′) | S ′′ ∈ shards(τ)} a global commit certificate.
To minimize inter-shard communication, one can utilize threshold signatures and cluster-sending
to carry over local prepare and commit certificates between shards via a few constant-sized messages.
The above three-phase global-Pbft protocol already takes care of the local input and cross-shard
exchange steps. Indeed, a replica r ∈ S that finishes the global commit phase has accepted global
preprepare certificate M , which contains all information of other shards to proceed with execution.
At the same time, r also has confirmation that M is prepared by a majority of all good replicas in
each shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ) (which will eventually be followed by execution of τ within S ′). With
these ingredients in place, only the decide outcome step remains.
The decide outcome step at shard S is entirely determined by the global preprepare certificate
M . Shard S decides to commit whenever I(S ′, τ) = D(S ′, τ) for all (〈τ〉c, I(S ′, τ), D(S ′, τ)) ∈ M .
Otherwise, it decides abort. If S decides commit, then all good replicas in S destruct all objects in
D(S, τ) and construct all objects o ∈ Outputs(τ) with S = shard(o). Finally, each good replica
informs c of the outcome of execution. If c receives, from every shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ), identical
outcomes from gS′ − fS distinct replicas in S ′, then it considers τ to be successfully executed. In
Figure 3, we sketched the working of OCerberus.
Due to the similarity between OCerberus and CCerberus, it is straightforward to use the
details of Theorem 4.3 to prove that OCerberus provides validity, shard-involvement, and shard-
applicability. Next, we will focus on how OCerberus provides cross-shard-consistency. As a first
step, we illustrate the ways in which the normal-case of OCerberus can fail (e.g., due to malicious
behavior of clients, failing replicas, or unreliable communication).
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Local Inputs and Cross-Shard Exchange
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Figure 3: The message flow of OCerberus for a 3-shard client request 〈τ〉c that is committed.
Example 5.1. Consider a transaction τ proposed by client c and affecting shard S ∈ shards(τ).
First, we consider the case in which P(S) is malicious and tries to set up a coordinated attack. To
have maximum control over the steps of OCerberus, the primary sends the message m(S, τ)v,ρ to
only gS′′ − fS′′ good replicas in each shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ). By doing so, P(S) can coordinate the
faulty replicas in each shard to assure failure of any phase at any replica r′ ∈ S ′, S ′ ∈ τ :
1. To prevent r′ from finishing the global preprepare phase (and start the global prepare phase)
for an M with m(S ′, τ)v′,ρ′ ∈M , P(S) simply does not send m(S, τ)v,ρ to r′.
2. To prevent r′ from finishing the global prepare phase (and start the global commit phase) for M ,
P(S) instructs the faulty replicas in F(S) to not send prepare messages for M to r′. Hence,
r′ will receive at-most gS − fS prepare messages for M from replicas in S, assuring that it will
not receive a local prepare certificate P (S) and will not finish the global prepare phase for M .
3. Likewise, to prevent r′ from finishing the global commit phase (and start execution) for M ,
P(S) instructs the faulty replicas in F(S) to not send commit messages to r′. Hence, r′ will
receive at-most gS − fS commit messages for M from replicas in S, assuring that it will not
receive a local commit certificate C(S) and will not finish the global commit phase for M .
None of the above attacks can be attributed to faulty behavior of P(S). First, unreliable commu-
nication can result in the same outcomes for r′. Furthermore, even if communication is reliable and
P(S) is good, we can see the same outcomes:
1. The client c can be malicious and not send τ to S. At the same time, all other primaries
P(S ′′) of shards S ′′ ∈ shards(τ) can be malicious and not send anything to S either. In this
case, P(S) will never be able to send any message m(S, τ)v,ρ to r′, as no replica in S is aware
of τ .
2. If any primary P(S ′′) of S ′′ ∈ shards(τ) is malicious, then it can prevent some replicas in
S from starting the global prepare phase, thereby preventing these replicas to send prepare
messages to r′. If P(S ′′) prevents sufficient replicas in S from starting the global prepare
phase, r′ will be unable to finish the global prepare phase.
3. Likewise, any malicious primary P(S ′′) of S ′′ ∈ shards(τ) can prevent replicas in S from
starting the global commit phase, thereby assuring that r′ will be unable to finish the global
commit phase.
To deal with malicious behavior, OCerberus needs a robust recovery mechanism. We cannot
simply build that mechanism on top of traditional view-change approaches: these traditional view-
change approaches require that one can identify a single source of failure (when communication is
reliable), namely the current primary. As Example 5.1 already showed, this property does not hold
for OCerberus. To remedy this, the recovery mechanisms of OCerberus has components that
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1: event r ∈ S is unable to finish round ρ of view v do
2: if r finished in round ρ the global prepare phase for M ,
but is unable to finish the global commit phase then
3: Let P be the global prepare certificate of r for M .
4: if r has a local commit certificate C(S ′′) for M then
5: for S ′ ∈ shards(τ) do
6: if r did not yet receive a local commit certificate C(S ′) then
7: Broadcast 〈VCGlobalSCR :M,P,C(S ′′)〉 to all replicas in S ′.
8: else
9: Detect the need for local state recovery of round ρ of view v (Figure 5).
10: else
11: Detect the need for local state recovery of round ρ of view v (Figure 5).
12: (Eventually repeat this event if r remains unable to finish round ρ.)
13: event r′ ∈ S ′ receives a message 〈VCGlobalSCR :M,P,C(S ′′)〉 from r ∈ S do
14: if r′ did not reach the global commit phase for M then
15: Use M , P , and C(S ′′) to reach the global commit phase for M .
16: else
17: Send a commit message for M to r.
Figure 4: The view-change global short-cut recovery path that determines whether r already has the
assurance that the current transaction will be committed. If this is the case, then r requests only
the missing information to proceed with execution. Otherwise, r requires at-least local recovery
(Figure 5).
perform local view-change and that perform global state recovery. The pseudo-code for this recovery
protocol can be found in Figure 4. Next, we describe the working of this recovery protocol in detail.
Let r ∈ S be a replica that determines that it cannot finish a round ρ of view v.
First, r determines whether it already has a guarantee on which transaction it has to execute
in round ρ. This is the case when the following conditions are met: r finished the global prepare
phase for M with m(S, τ)v,ρ ∈ M and has received a local commit certificate C(S ′′) for M from
some shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ). In this case, r can simply request all missing local commit certificates
directly, as C(S ′′) can be used to prove to any involved replica r′ ∈ S ′, S ′ ∈ shards(τ), that r′
also needs to commit to M . To request such missing commit certificates of S ′, replica r sends out
VCGlobalSCR messages to all replicas in S ′ (Line 7 of Figure 4). Any replica r′ that receives such a
VCGlobalSCR message can use the information in that message to reach the global commit phase
for M and, hence, provide r with the requested commit messages (Line 13 of Figure 4).
If r does not have a guarantee itself on which transaction it has to execute in round ρ, then it
needs to determine whether any other replica (either in its own shard or in any other shard) has
already received and acted upon such a guarantee. To initiate such local and global state recovery,
r simply detects the current view as faulty. To do so, r broadcasts a VCRecoveryRQ message to
all other replicas in S that contains all information r collected on round ρ in view v (Line 4 of
Figure 5). Other replicas q ∈ S that already have guarantees for round ρ can help r by providing
all missing information (Line 6 of Figure 5). On receipt of this information, r can proceed with the
round (Line 7 of Figure 5). If no replicas can provide the missing information, then eventually all
good replicas will detect the need for local recovery, this either by themselves (Line 1 of Figure 5)
or after receiving VCRecoveryRQ messages of at-least fS + 1 distinct replicas in S, of which at-least
a single replica must be good (Line 10 of Figure 5).
Finally, if a replica r receives gS VCRecoveryRQmessages, then it has the guarantee that at least
gS − fS ≥ fS +1 of these messages come from good replicas in S. Hence, due to Line 10 of Figure 5,
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1: event r ∈ S detects the need for local state recovery of round ρ of view v do
2: Let M be the latest global preprepare certificate accepted for round ρ by r (if any).
3: Let S be M and any prepare and commit certificates for M collected by r.
4: Broadcast 〈VCRecoveryRQ : v, ρ, S〉.
5: event q ∈ S receives messages 〈VCRecoveryRQ : v, ρ, S〉 of r ∈ S and q has
1. started the global prepare phase for M with m(S, τ)w,ρ ∈M ;
2. a global prepare certificate for M ;
3. a local commit certificate C(S ′′) for M
do
6: Send 〈VCLocalSCR :M,P,C(S ′′)〉 to r ∈ S.
7: event r ∈ S receives a message 〈VCLocalSCR :M,P,C(S ′′)〉 from q ∈ S do
8: if r did not reach the global commit phase for M then
9: Use M , P , and C to reach the global commit phase for M .
10: event r ∈ S receives messages 〈VCRecoveryRQ : vi, ρ, Si〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ fS + 1,
from distinct replicas in S do
11: r detects the need for local state recovery of round ρ of view min{vi | 1 ≤ i ≤ fS + 1}.
12: event r ∈ S receives messages 〈VCRecoveryRQ : v, ρ, Si〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ gS ,
from distinct replicas in S do
13: if id(r) 6= (v + 1) mod nS then
14: (r awaits the NewView message of the new primary, Line 15 of Figure 6.)
15: else
16: Broadcast 〈NewView : 〈VCRecoveryRQ : v, ρ, Si〉 | 1 ≤ i ≤ gS〉 to all replicas in S.
17: if there exists a Si that contains global preprepare certificate M ,
but no Sj contains a local commit certificate for M then
18: r initiates global state recovery of round ρ (Line 1 of Figure 6).
Figure 5: The view-change local short-cut recovery path that determines whether some q can provide
r with the assurance that the current transaction will be committed. If this is the case, then r only
needs this assurance, otherwise S requires a new view (Figure 6).
all gS good replicas in S will send VCRecoveryRQ, and, when communication is reliable, also receive
these messages. Consequently, at this point, r can start the new view by electing a new primary and
awaiting the NewView proposal of this new primary (Line 12 of Figure 5). If r is the new primary,
then it starts the new view by proposing a NewView. As other shards could have already made final
decisions depending on local prepare or commit certificates of S for round ρ, we need to assure that
such certificates are not invalidated. To figure out whether such final decisions have been made,
the new primary will query other shards S ′ for their state whenever the NewView message contains
global preprepare certificates for transactions τ , S ′ ∈ shards(τ), but not a local commit certificate
to guarantee execution of τ (Line 17 of Figure 5).
The new-view process has three stages. First, the new primary p proposes the new-view via a
NewView message (Line 12 of Figure 5). If necessary, the new primary p also requests the relevant
global state from any relevant shard (Line 1 of Figure 6). The replicas in other shards will respond
to this request with their local state (Line 9 of Figure 6). The new primary collects these responses
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1: event p ∈ S initiates global state recovery of round ρ using 〈NewView : V 〉 do
2: Let T be the transactions with global preprepare certificates for round ρ of S in V .
3: Let S be the shards affected by transactions in T .
4: Broadcast 〈VCGlobalStateRQ : v, ρ, V 〉 to all replicas in S ′ ∈ S.
5: for S ′ ∈ S do
6: Wait for VCGlobalStateRQ messages for V from gS′ distinct replicas in S
′.
7: Let W (S ′) be the set of received VCGlobalStateRQ messages.
8: Broadcast 〈NewViewGlobal : V, {W (S ′) | S ′ ∈ S}〉 to all replicas in S.
9: event r′ ∈ S ′ receives message 〈VCGlobalStateRQ : v, ρ, V 〉 from p ∈ S do
10: if r′ has a global preprepare certificate M with m(S, τ)w,ρ ∈M
and reached the global commit phase for M then
11: Let P be the global prepare certificate for M .
12: Send 〈VCGlobalStateR : v, ρ, V,M, P 〉 to p.
13: else
14: Send 〈VCGlobalStateR : v, ρ, V 〉 to p.
15: event r ∈ S receives a valid 〈NewView : V 〉 message from replica p do
16: if there exists a 〈VCRecoveryRQ : vi, ρ, Si〉 ∈ V that contains
a global preprepare certificate M with m(S, τ)w,ρ ∈M ,
a global prepare certificate P for M , and a local commit certificate C(S ′′) for M then
17: Use M , P , and C to reach the global commit phase for M .
18: else if there exists a 〈VCRecoveryRQ : vi, ρ, Si〉 ∈ V that contains
a global preprepare certificate M ,
but no 〈VCRecoveryRQ : vj , ρ, Sj〉 ∈ V contains a local commit certificate for M then
19: r detects the need for global state recovery of round ρ (Line 22 of Figure 6).
20: else
21: (p must propose for round ρ.)
22: event r ∈ S receives a valid 〈NewViewGlobal : V,W 〉 from p ∈ S do
23: if any message in W is of the form 〈VCGlobalStateR : v, ρ, V,M, P 〉 then
24: Select 〈VCGlobalStateR : v, ρ, V,M, P 〉 ∈W with latest view w, m(S, τ)w,ρ ∈M .
25: Use M and P to reach the global commit phase for M .
26: else
27: (p must propose for round ρ.)
Figure 6: The view-change new-view recovery path that recovers the state of the previous view
based on a NewView proposal of the new primary. As part of the new-view recovery path, the new
primary can construct a global new-view that contains the necessary information from other shards
to reconstruct the local state.
and sends them to all replicas in S via a NewViewGlobal message.
Then, after p sends the NewView message to r ∈ S, r determines whether the NewView message
contains sufficient information to recover round ρ (Line 16 of Figure 6), contains sufficient information
to wait for any relevant global state (Line 18 of Figure 6), or to determine that the new primary
must propose for round ρ (Line 21 of Figure 6). If r determines it needs to wait for any relevant
global state, then r will wait for this state to arrive via a NewViewGlobal message. Based on the
received global state, r determines to recover round ρ (Line 23 of Figure 6), or determines that the
new primary must propose for round ρ (Line 26 of Figure 6).
Next, we shall prove the correctness of the view-change protocol outlined in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
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First, using a standard quorum argument, we prove that in a single round of a single view of S, only
a single global preprepare message affecting S can get committed by any other affected shards:
Lemma 5.2. Let τ1 and τ2 be transactions with S ∈ (shards(τ1) ∩ shards(τ2)). If gS > 2fS and
there exists shards Si ∈ shards(τi), i ∈ {1, 2}, such that good replicas ri ∈ G(Si) reached the global
commit phase for global preprepare certificate Mi with m(S, τi)v,ρ ∈Mi, then τ1 = τ2.
Proof. We prove this property using contradiction. We assume τ1 6= τ2. Let Pi(S) be the local
prepare certificate provided by S for Mi and used by ri to reach the global commit phase, let
Si ⊆ S be the gS replicas in S that provided the prepare messages in Pi(S), and let Ti = Si \ F(S)
be the good replicas in Si. By construction, we have |Ti| ≥ gS − fS . As all replicas in T1 ∪ T2 are
good, they will only send out a single prepare message per round ρ of view v. Hence, if τ1 6= τ2,
then T1 ∩ T2 = ∅, and we must have 2(gS − fS) ≤ |T1 ∪ T2|. As all replicas in T1 ∪ T2 are good, we
also have |T1 ∪ T2| ≤ gS . Hence, 2(gS − fS) ≤ gS , which simplifies to gS ≤ 2fS , a contradiction.
Hence, we conclude τ1 = τ2.
Next, we use Lemma 5.2 to prove that any global preprepare certificate that could have been
accepted by any good affected replica is preserved by OCerberus:
Proposition 5.3. Let τ be a transaction and m(S, τ)v,ρ be a preprepare message. If, for all shards
S∗, gS∗ > 2fS∗ , and there exists a shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ) such that gS′ − fS′ good replicas in S ′
reached the global commit phase for M with m(S, τ)v,ρ ∈ M , then every successful future view of
S will recover M and assure that the good replicas in S reach the commit phase for M .
Proof. Let v∗ ≤ v be the first view in which a global prepare certificate M∗ with m(S, τ∗)v∗,ρ ∈M∗
satisfied the premise of this proposition. Using induction on the number of views after the first view
v∗, we will prove the following two properties on M∗:
1. every good replica that participates in view w, v∗ < w, will recover M∗ upon entering view w
and reach the commit phase for M∗; and
2. no replica will be able to construct a local prepare certificate of S for any global preprepare
certificate M † 6=M∗ with m(S, τ†)w,ρ ∈M
†, v∗ < w.
The base case is view v∗+1. Let S′ ⊆ G(S ′) be the set of gS′ − fS′ good replicas in S ′ that reached
the global commit phase forM∗. Each replica r′ ∈ S′ has a local prepare certificate P (S) consisting
of gS prepare messages for M
∗ provided by replicas in S. We write S(r′) ⊆ G(S) to denote the
at-least gS − fS good replicas in S that provided such a prepare message to r
′.
Consider any valid new-view proposal 〈NewView : V 〉 for view v∗+1. If the conditions of Line 16
of Figure 6 hold for some global preprepare certificate M † with m(S, τ‡)w,ρ ∈M ‡, then we recover
M ‡. As there is a local commit certificate for M ‡ in this case, the premise of this proposition holds
on M ‡. As v∗ is the first view in which the premise of this proposition hold, we can use Lemma 5.2
to conclude that w = v∗, M ‡ =M∗, and, hence, that the base case holds if the conditions of Line 16
of Figure 6 hold. Next, we assume that the conditions of Line 16 of Figure 6 do not hold, in which
case M∗ can only be recovered via global state recovery. As the first step in global state recovery is
proving that the condition of Line 18 of Figure 6 holds. Let T ⊆ G(S) be the set of at-least gS − fS
good replicas in S whose VCRecoveryRQ message is in V and let r′ ∈ S′. We have |S(r′)| ≥ gS − fS
and |T | ≥ gS − fS . Hence, by a standard quorum argument, we conclude S(r′) ∩ T 6= ∅. Let
q ∈ (S(r′) ∩ T ). As q is good and send prepare messages for M∗, it must have reached the global
prepare phase for M∗. Consequently, the condition of Line 18 of Figure 6 holds and to complete the
proof, we only need to prove that any well-formed NewViewGlobal message will recover M∗.
Let 〈NewViewGlobal : V,W 〉 be any valid global new-view proposal for view v∗+1. As q reached
the global prepare phase for M∗, any valid global new-view proposal must include messages from
S ′ ∈ shards(τ). Let U ′ ⊆ S ′ be the replicas in S ′ of whom messages VCGlobalStateR are included
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in W . Let V ′ = U ′ \ F(S ′). We have |S′| ≥ gS′ − fS′ and |V ′| ≥ gS′ − fS′ . Hence, by a standard
quorum argument, we conclude S′ ∩ V ′ 6= ∅′. Let q′ ∈ (S′ ∩ V ′). As q′ reached the global commit
phase for M∗, it will meet the conditions of Line 25 of Figure 6 and provide both M∗ and a global
prepare certificate for M∗. Let M ‡ be any other global preprepare certificate in W accompanied
by a global prepare certificate. Due to Line 24 of Figure 6, the global preprepare certificate for the
newest view of S will be recovered. As v∗ is the newest view of S, M ‡ will only prevent recovery of
M∗ if it is also a global preprepare certificate for view v∗ of S. In this case, Lemma 5.2 guarantees
that M ‡ =M∗. Hence, any replica r will recover M∗ upon receiving 〈NewViewGlobal : V,W 〉.
Now assume that the induction hypothesis holds for all views j, v∗ < j ≤ i. We will prove that
the induction hypothesis holds for view i + 1. Consider any valid new-view proposal 〈NewView : V 〉
for view i+1 and letM ‡ with m(S, τ‡)w,ρ ∈M ‡ be any global preprepare certificate that is recovered
due to the new-view proposal 〈NewView : V 〉. Hence, M ‡ is recovered via either Line 17 of Figure 6
or Line 25 of Figure 6. In both cases, there must exist a global prepare certificate P for M ‡. As
〈NewView : V 〉 is valid, we must have w ≤ i. Hence, we can apply the second property of the
induction hypothesis to conclude that w ≤ v∗. If w = v∗, then we can use Lemma 5.2 to conclude
that M ‡ =M∗. Hence, to complete the proof, we must show that w = v∗. First, the case in which
M ‡ is recovered via Line 17 of Figure 6. Due to the existence of a global commit certificate C for
M ‡, M ‡ satisfies the premise of this proposition. By assumption, v∗ is the first view for which the
premise of this proposition holds. Hence, w ≥ v∗, in which case we conclude M ‡ = M∗. Last,
the case in which M ‡ is recovered via Line 25 of Figure 6. In this case, M ‡ is recovered via some
message 〈NewViewGlobal : V,W 〉. Analogous to the proof for the base case, V will contain a message
VCRecoveryRQ from some replica q ∈ S(r′). Due to Line 2 of Figure 5, q will provide information
on M∗. Consequently, a prepare certificate for M∗ will be obtained via global state recovery, and
we also conclude M ‡ =M∗.
Lemma 5.2 and Proposition 5.3 are technical properties that assures that no transaction that
could-be-committed by any replica will ever get lost by the system. Next, we bootstrap these
technical properties to prove that all good replicas can always recover such could-be-committed
transactions.
Proposition 5.4. Let τ be a transaction and m(S, τ)v,ρ be a preprepare message. If, for all shards
S∗, gS∗ > 2fS∗ , and there exists a shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ) such that gS′ − fS′ good replicas in S ′
reached the global commit phase for M with m(S, τ)v,ρ ∈ M , then every good replica in S will
accept M whenever communication becomes reliable.
Proof. Let r ∈ S be a good replica that is unable to accept M . At some point, communication
becomes reliable, after which r will eventually trigger Line 1 of Figure 4. We have the following
cases:
1. If r meets the conditions of Line 4 of Figure 4, then r has a local commit certificate C(S ′′),
S ′′ ∈ shards(τ). This local commit certificate certifies that at least gS′′ − fS′′ good replicas
in S ′′ finished the global prepare phase for M . Hence, the conditions for Proposition 5.3 are
met for M and, hence, any shard in shards(τ) will maintain or recover M . Replica r can use
C(S ′′) to prove this situation to other replicas, forcing them to commit to M , and provide any
commit messages r is missing (Line 13 of Figure 4).
2. If r does not meet the conditions of Line 4 of Figure 4, but some other good replica q ∈ S
does, then q can provide all missing information to r (Line 6 of Figure 5). Next, r uses this
information (Line 7 of Figure 5), after which it meets the conditions of Line 4 of Figure 4.
3. Otherwise, if the above two cases do not hold, then all gS good replicas in S are unable to
finish the commit phase. Hence, they perform a view-change. Due to Proposition 5.3, this
view-change will succeed and put every replica in S into the commit phase for M . As all good
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replicas in S are in the commit phase, each good replica in S will be able to make a local
commit certificate C(S) for M , after which they meet the conditions of Line 4 of Figure 4.
Finally, we use Proposition 5.4 to prove cross-shard-consistency.
Theorem 5.5. Optimistic-Cerberus maintains cross-shard-consistency.
Proof. Assume a single good replica r ∈ S commits or aborts a transaction τ . Hence, it accepted
some global preprepare certificate M with m(S, τ)v,ρ ∈ M . Consequently, r has local commit
certificates C(S ′) for M of every S ′ ∈ shards(τ). Hence, at least gS′ − fS′ good replicas in S
′
reached the global commit phase for M , and we can apply Proposition 5.4 to conclude that any
good replica r′′ ∈ S ′′, S ′′ ∈ shards(τ) will accept M . As r′′ bases its commit or abort decision for
τ on the same global prepare certificate M as r, they will both make the same decision, completing
the proof.
As already argued, it is straightforward to use the details of Theorem 4.3 to prove that OCer-
berus provides validity, shard-involvement, and shard-applicability. Via Theorem 5.5, we proved
cross-shard-consistency. We cannot prove service and confirmation, however. The reason for this is
simple: even though OCerberus can detect and recover from accidental faulty behavior and acci-
dental concurrent transactions, OCerberus is not designed to gracefully handle targeted attacks.
Example 5.6. Recall the situation of Example 4.1. Next, we illustrate how OCerberus deals
with these concurrent transactions. We again consider distinct transactions 〈τ1〉c1 and 〈τ2〉c2 with
Inputs(τ1) = Inputs(τ2) = {o1, o2} and with shard(o1) = S1 and shard(o2) = S2. We assume that
S1 processes τ1 first and S2 processes τ2 first.
The primary P(S1) will propose τ1 by prepreparing m(S1, τ1)v1,ρ1 . In doing so, P(S1) sends
m(S1, τ1)v1,ρ1 to all replicas S1 ∪ S2. Next, the replicas in S1 will wait for a message m(S2, τ1)v′2,ρ′2
from S2. At the same time, P(S2) already proposed τ2 at the same time by sending out m(S2, τ2)v2,ρ2 ,
and the replicas in S2 will wait for a message m(S1, τ2)v′
1
,ρ′
1
. Hence, the replicas in S1 will never
receive m(S2, τ1)v′
2
,ρ′
2
and the replicas in S2 will never receive m(S1, τ2)v′
1
,ρ′
1
. Consequently, no replica
will finish global preprepare, the consensus round will fail for all replicas, and all good replicas will
initiate a view-change. As no replica reached the global prepare phase, transactions τ1 and τ2 do not
need to be recovered during the view-change. After the view-changes, both S1 and S2 can process
other transactions (or retry τ1 or τ2), but if they both process τ1 and τ2 again, the system will again
initiate a view-change.
As said before, OCerberus is optimistic in the sense that it is optimized for the situation in
which faulty behavior (including concurrent transactions) is rare. Still, in all cases, OCerberus
maintains cross-shard consistency, however. Moreover, in the optimistic case in which shards have
good primaries and no concurrent transactions exist, progress is guaranteed whenever communication
is reliable:
Proposition 5.7. If, for all shards S∗, gS∗ > 2fS∗ , and Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 hold,
then Optimistic-Cerberus satisfies Requirements R1–R6 in the optimistic case.
If the optimistic assumption does not hold, then this can result in coordinated attempts to prevent
OCerberus from making progress. At the core of such attacks is the ability for malicious clients and
malicious primaries to corrupt the operations of shards coordinated by good primaries, as already
shown in Example 5.1. To reduce the impact of targeted attacks, one can opt to make primary
election non-deterministic, e.g., by using shard-specific distributed coins to elect new primaries in
individual shards [11, 13].
As a final note, we remark that we have presented OCerberus with a per-round checkpoint
and recovery method. In this simplified design, the recovery path only has to recover at-most a
single round. Our approach can easily be generalized to a more typical multi-round checkpoint and
recovery method, however. Furthermore, we believe that the way in which OCerberus extends
Pbft can easily be generalized to other consensus protocols, e.g., HotStuff.
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Figure 7: The message flow of PCerberus for a 3-shard client request 〈τ〉c that is committed.
6 Pessimistic-Cerberus: transaction processing under attack
In the previous section, we introduced OCerberus, a general-purpose minimalistic and efficient
multi-shard transaction processing protocol. OCerberus is designed with the assumption that
malicious behavior is rare, due to which it can minimize coordination in the normal-case while
requiring intricate coordination when recovering from attacks. As an alternative to the optimistic
approach of OCerberus, we can apply a pessimistic approach to CCerberus to gracefully recover
from concurrent transactions that is geared towards minimizing the influence of malicious behavior
altogether. Next, we explore such a pessimistic design via Pessimistic-Cerberus (PCerberus).
The design of PCerberus builds upon the design of CCerberus by adding additional coordi-
nation to the cross-shard exchange and decide outcome steps. As in CCerberus, the acceptance
of m(S, τ)ρ in round ρ by all good replicas completes the local inputs step. Before cross-shard
exchange, the replicas in S destruct the objects in D(S, τ), thereby fully pledging these objects
to τ until the commit or abort decision. Then, S performs cross-shard exchange by broadcasting
m(S, τ)ρ to all other shards in shards(τ), while the replicas in S wait until they receive messages
m(S ′, τ)ρ′ = (〈τ〉c, I(S ′, τ), D(S ′, τ)) from all other shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ).
After cross-shard exchange comes the final decide outcome step. After S receives m(S ′, τ)ρ′ from
all shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ), the replicas force a second consensus step that determines the round ρ∗
at which S decides commit (whenever I(S ′, τ) = D(S ′, τ) for all S ′ ∈ shards(τ)) or abort. If S
decides commit, then, in round ρ∗, all good replicas in S construct all objects o ∈ Outputs(τ) with
S = shard(o). If S decides abort, then, in round ρ∗, all good replicas in S reconstruct all objects in
D(S, τ) (rollback). Finally, each good replica informs c of the outcome of execution. If c receives,
from every shard S ′ ∈ shards(τ), identical outcomes from gS′ − fS distinct replicas in S ′, then it
considers τ to be successfully executed. In Figure 7, we sketched the working of PCerberus.
We notice that processing a multi-shard transaction via PCerberus requires two consensus steps
per shard. In some cases, we can eliminate the second step, however. First, if τ is a multi-shard
transaction with S ∈ shards(τ) and the replicas in S accept (〈τ〉c, I(S, τ), D(S, τ)) with I(S, τ) 6=
D(S, τ), then the replicas can immediately abort whenever they accept (〈τ〉c, I(S, τ), D(S, τ)). Sec-
ond, if τ is a single-shard transaction with shards(τ) = {S}, then the replicas in S can immediately
decide commit or abort whenever they accept (〈τ〉c, I(S, τ), D(S, τ)). Hence, in both cases, process-
ing of τ at S only requires a single consensus step at S.
Next, we illustrate how PCerberus deals with concurrent transactions.
Example 6.1. Recall the situation of Example 4.1. Next, we illustrate how PCerberus deals
with these concurrent transactions. We again consider distinct transactions 〈τ1〉c1 and 〈τ2〉c2 with
Inputs(τ1) = Inputs(τ2) = {o1, o2} and with shard(o1) = S1 and shard(o2) = S2. We assume that
S1 processes τ1 first and S2 processes τ2 first.
Shard S1 will start by destructing o1 and sends (〈τ1〉c1 , {o1}, {o1}) to S2. Next, S1 will wait, dur-
ing which it receives τ2. At the same time, S2 follows similar steps for τ2 and sends (〈τ2〉c2 , {o2}, {o2})
to S1. While S1 is waiting for information on τ1 from S2, it receives τ2 and starts processing of τ2.
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Shard S1 directly determines that o1 does no longer exist. Hence, it sends (〈τ2〉c2 , {o1}, ∅}) to S2.
Likewise, S2 will start processing of τ1, sending (〈τ1〉c1 , {o2}, ∅) to S1 as a result.
After the above exchange, both S1 and S2 conclude that transactions τ1 and τ2 must be aborted,
which they eventually both do, after which o1 is restored in S1 and o2 is restored in S2.
We notice that this situation leads to both transactions being aborted. Furthermore, we see
that even though transactions get aborted, individual replicas can all determine whether their shard
performed the necessary steps and, hence, whether their primary operated correctly. Next, we prove
the correctness of PCerberus:
Theorem 6.2. If, for all shards S∗, gS∗ > 2fS∗, and Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 hold, then
Pessimistic-Cerberus satisfies Requirements R1–R6.
Proof. Let τ be a transaction. As good replicas in S discard τ if it is invalid or if S /∈ shards(τ),
PCerberus provides validity and shard-involvement. Next, shard-applicability follow directly from
the decide outcome step.
If a shard S commits or aborts transaction τ , then it must have completed the decide outcome
and cross-shard exchange steps. As S completed cross-shard exchange, all shards S ′ ∈ shards(τ)
must have exchanged the necessary information to S. By relying on cluster-sending for cross-shard
exchange, S ′ requires cooperation of all good replicas in S ′ to exchange the necessary information
to S. Hence, we have the guarantee that these good replicas will also perform cross-shard exchange
to any other shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ). Hence, every shard S ′′ ∈ shards(τ) will receive the same
information as S, complete cross-shard exchange, and make the same decision during the decide
outcome step, providing cross-shard consistency.
A client can force service on a transaction τ by choosing a shard S ∈ shards(τ) and sending
τ to all good replicas in G(S). By doing so, the normal mechanisms of consensus can be used by
the good replicas in G(S) to force acceptance on τ in S and, hence, bootstrapping acceptance on
τ in all shards S ′ ∈ G(S). Due to cross-shard consistency, every shard in shards(τ) will perform
the necessary steps to eventually inform the client. As all good replicas r ∈ S, S ∈ shards(τ),
will inform the client of the outcome for τ , the majority of these inform-messages come from good
replicas, enabling the client to reliably derive the true outcome. Hence, CCerberus provides service
and confirmation.
7 The strengths of Cerberus
Having introduced the three variants of Cerberus in Sections 4, 5, and 6, we will now analyze
the strengths and performance characteristics of each of the variants. First, we will show that
Cerberus provides serializable execution [6, 9]. Second, we look at the ability of Cerberus to
maximize per-shard throughput by supporting out-of-order processing. Finally, we compare the
costs, the attainable performance, and the scalability of the three protocols.
7.1 The ordering of transactions in Cerberus
The data model utilized by CCerberus, OCerberus, and PCerberus guarantees that any object
o can only be involved in at-most two committed transactions: one that constructs o and another
one that destructs o. Assume the existence of such transactions τ1 and τ2 with o ∈ Outputs(τ1) and
o ∈ Inputs(τ2). Due to cross-shard-consistency (Requirement R4), the shard shard(o) will have to
execute both τ1 and τ2. Moreover, due to shard-applicability (Requirement R3), the shard shard(o)
will execute τ1 strictly before τ2. Now consider the relation
≺ := {(τ, τ ′) | (the system committed to τ and τ ′) ∧ (Outputs(τ) ∩ Inputs(τ ′) 6= ∅)}.
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Obviously, we have ≺(τ1, τ2). Next, we will prove that all committed transactions are executed in a
serializable ordering. As a first step, we prove the following:
Lemma 7.1. If we interpret transactions as nodes and ≺ as an edge relation, then the resulting
graph is acyclic.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let G be the graph-interpretation of ≺. We assume that
graph G is cyclic. Hence, there exists transactions τ0, . . . , τm−1 such that ≺(τi, τi+1), 0 ≤ i <
m − 1, and ≺(τm−1, τ0). By the definition of ≺, we can choose objects oi, 0 ≤ i < m, with
oi ∈ (Outputs(τi) ∩ Inputs(τ(i+1) mod m)). Due to cross-shard-consistency (Requirement R4), the
shard shard(oi), 0 ≤ i < m, executed transactions τi and τ(i+1) mod m.
Consider oi, 0 ≤ i < m, and let ti be the time at which shard shard(oi) executed τi and
constructed oi. Due to shard-applicability (Requirement R3), we know that shard shard(oi) exe-
cuted τ(i+1) mod m strictly after ti. Moreover, also shard shard(o(i+1) mod m) must have executed
τ(i+1) mod m strictly after ti and we derive ti < t(i+1) mod m. Hence, we must have t0 < t1 < · · · <
tm−1 < t0, a contradiction. Consequently, G must be acyclic.
To derive a serializable execution order for all committed transactions, we simply construct
a directed acyclic graph in which transactions are nodes and ≺ is the edge relation. Next, we
topologically sort the graph to derive the searched-for ordering. Hence, we conclude:
Theorem 7.2. A sharded fault-tolerant system that uses the object-dataset data model, processes
UTXO-like transactions, and satisfies Requirements R1-R5 commits transactions in a serializable
order.
We notice that Cerberus only provides serializability for committed transactions. As we have
seen in Example 6.1, concurrent transactions are not executed in a serializable order, as they are
aborted. It is this flexibility in dealing with aborted transactions that allows all variants of Cer-
berus to operate with minimal and fully-decentralized coordination between shards; while still
providing strong isolation for all committed transactions.
7.2 Out-of-order processing in Cerberus
In normal consensus-based systems, the latency for a single consensus decision is ultimately deter-
mined by the message delay δ. E.g., with the three-phase design of Pbft, it will take at least 3δ
before a transaction that arrives at the primary is executed by all replicas. To minimize the influ-
ence of message delay on throughput, some consensus-based systems support out-of-order decision
making in which the primary is allowed to maximize bandwidth usage by continuously proposing
transactions for future rounds (while previous rounds are processed by the replicas). To illustrate
this, one can look at fine-tuned implementations of Pbft running at replicas that have sufficient
memory buffers available [16, 30]. In this setting, replicas can work on several consensus rounds at
the same time by allowing the primary to propose for rounds within a window of rounds.
As the goal of Cerberus is to maximize performance—both in terms of latency (OCerberus)
and in terms of throughput—we have designed Cerberus to support out-of-order processing (if
provided by the underlying consensus protocol, in the case of CCerberus and PCerberus). The
only limitation to these out-of-order processing capabilities are with respect to transactions affecting
a shared object: such transactions must be proposed strictly in-order, as otherwise the set of pledged
inputs cannot be correctly determined by the good replicas. This is not a limitation for the normal-
case operations, however, as such concurrent transactions only happen due to malicious behavior.
7.3 A comparison of the three Cerberus variants
Finally, we compare the practical costs of the three Cerberus multi-shard transaction processing
protocols. First, in Figure 8, we provide a high-level comparison of the costs of each of the protocols
19
Normal-case complexity Concurrent View-changes
Protocol name Consensus Exchange Phases Transactions
CCerberus s 1 4 Objects pledged Single-shard
OCerberus s 3 3 View-change & Abort Multi-shard
PCerberus 2s 1 7 Normal-case Abort Single-shard
Figure 8: Comparison of the three Cerberus protocols for processing a transaction that affects s
shards. We compare the normal-case complexity, how they deal with concurrent transactions (due
to malicious clients), and how they deal with malicious primaries.
to process a single transaction τ that affects s = |shards(τ)| distinct shards. For the normal-case
behavior, we compare the complexity in the number of consensus steps per shard and the number of
cross-shard exchange steps between shards (which together determine the maximum throughput),
and the number of consecutive communication phases (which determines the minimum latency).
Next, we compare how the three protocols deal with malicious behavior by clients and by replicas.
If no clients behave malicious, then all transactions will commit. In all three protocols, malicious
behavior by clients can lead to the existence of concurrent transactions that affect the same object.
Upon detection of such concurrent transactions, all three protocols will abort. The consequences of
such an abort are different in the three protocols.
In CCerberus, objects affected by aborted transactions remain pledged and cannot be reused.
In practice, this loss of objects can provide an incentive for clients to not behave malicious, but
does limit the usability of CCerberus in non-incentivized environments. OCerberus is optimized
with the assumption that conflicting concurrent transactions are rare. When conflicts occur, they
can lead to the failure of a global consensus round, which can lead to a view-change in one or more
affected shards (even if none of the primaries is faulty). Finally, PCerberus deals with concurrent
transactions by aborting them via the normal-case of the protocol. To be able to do so, PCerberus
does require additional consensus steps, however.
The three Cerberus protocols are resilient against malicious replicas: only malicious primaries
can affect the normal-case operations of these protocols. If malicious primaries behave sufficiently
malicious to affect the normal-case operations, their behavior is detected, and the primary is replaced.
In both CCerberus and PCerberus, dealing with a malicious primary in a shard can be done
completely in isolation of all other shards. In OCerberus, which is optimized with the assumption
that failures are rare, the failure of a primary while processing a transaction τ can lead to view-
changes in all shards affected by τ .
Finally, we illustrate the performance of Cerberus. To do so, we have modeled the maximum
throughput of each of these protocols in an environment where each shard has seven replicas (of
which two can be faulty) and each replica has a bandwidth of 100Mbit s−1. We have chosen to opti-
mize CCerberus, OCerberus, and PCerberus to minimize processing latencies over minimizing
bandwidth usage (e.g., we do not batch requests and the cross-shard exchange steps do not utilize
threshold signatures; with these techniques in place we can boost throughput by a constant factor
at the cost of the per-transaction processing latency). In Figure 9, we have visualized the maximum
attainable throughput for each of the protocols as function of the number of shards. In Figure 10,
we have visualized the number of per-shard steps performed by the system (for CCerberus and
OCerberus, this is equivalent to the number of per-shard consensus steps, for PCerberus this is
half the number of per-shard consensus steps). As one can see from these figures, all three protocols
have excellent scalability: increasing the number of shards will increase the overall throughput of
the system. Sharding does come with clear overheads, however, increasing the number of shards also
increases the number of shards affected by each transaction, thereby increasing the overall number
of consensus steps. This is especially true for very large transactions that affect many objects (that
can affect many distinct shards).
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Figure 9: Throughput of the three Cerberus protocols as a function of the number of shards.
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Figure 10: Amount of work, in terms of consensus steps, for the shards involved in processing the
transactions.
8 Related Work
Distributed systems are typically employed to either increase reliability (e.g., via consensus-based
fault-tolerance) or to increase performance (e.g., via sharding). Consequently, there is abundant
literature on such distributed systems, distributed databases, and sharding (e.g., [46, 49, 50]) and
on consensus-based fault-tolerant systems (e.g., [10, 14, 19, 31, 49]). Next, we shall focus on the few
works that deal with sharding in fault-tolerant systems.
Several recent system papers have proposed specialized systems that combine sharding with
consensus-based resilient systems. Examples include AHL [17], Caper [3], Chainspace [1], and
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SharPer [4], which all use sharding for data management and transaction processing. Systems
such as AHL and Caper are designed with single-shard workloads in mind, as they rely on central-
ized orderers to order and process multi-shard transactions, whereas systems such as Chainspace
and SharPer are closer to the decentralized design of Cerberus. In specific, Chainspace uses
a consensus-based commit protocol that performs three consecutive consensus and cross-shard ex-
change steps that resemble the two-step approach of PCerberus (although the details of the re-
covery path are rather different). In comparison, Cerberus greatly improves on the design of
Chainspace by reducing the number of consecutive consensus steps necessary to process transac-
tions and by introducing out-of-order transaction processing capabilities. Finally, SharPer inte-
grates global consensus steps in a consensus protocol in a similar manner as OCerberus. Their
focus is mainly on a crash-tolerant Paxos protocol, however, and they do not fully explorer the
details of a full Byzantine fault-tolerant recovery path.
A few fully-replicate consensus-based systems utilize sharding at the level of consensus decision
making, this to improve consensus throughput [2, 22, 26, 29]. In these systems, only a small subset
of all replicas, those in a single shard, participate in the consensus on any given transaction, thereby
reducing the costs to replicate this transaction without improving storage and processing scalability.
Finally, the recently-proposed delayed-replication algorithm aims at improving scalability of resilient
systems by separating fault-tolerant data storage from specialized data processing tasks [33], the
latter of which can be distributed over many participants.
Recently, there has also been promising work on sharding and techniques supporting sharding
for permissionless blockchains. Examples include techniques to enable sidechains, blockchain re-
lays, and atomic swaps [23, 24, 34, 39, 52], which each enable various forms of cooperation between
blockchains (including simple cross-chain communication and cross-chain transaction coordination).
Unfortunately, these permissionless techniques are several orders of magnitudes slower than compa-
rable techniques for traditional fault-tolerant systems, making them incomparable with the design
of Cerberus discussed in this work.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced Core-Cerberus, Optimistic-Cerberus, and Pessimistic-Cerberus,
three fully distributed approaches towards multi-shard fault-tolerant transaction processing. The
design of these approaches is geared towards processing UTXO-like transactions in sharded dis-
tributed ledger networks with minimal cost, while maximizing performance. By using the properties
of UTXO-like transactions to our advantage, both Core-Cerberus and Optimistic-Cerberus are
optimized for cases with fewer expected malicious behaviors, in which case they are able to provide
serializable transaction processing with only a single consensus step per affected shard, whereas
Pessimistic-Cerberus is optimized to efficiently deal with a broad-range of malicious behavior at
the cost of a second consensus step during normal operations.
The core ideas of Cerberus are not tied to any particular underlying consensus protocol. In
this work, we have chosen to build Cerberus on top of Pbft, as our experience shows that well-
tuned implementations that use out-of-order processing of this protocol can outperform most other
protocols in raw throughput [30]. Combining other consensus protocols with Cerberus will result in
other trade-offs between maximum throughput, per-transaction latency, bandwidth usage, and (for
protocols that do not support out-of-order processing) vulnerability to message delays. Applying the
ideas of Cerberus fully onto other consensus protocols in a fully fine-tuned manner remains open,
however. E.g., we are very interested in seeing whether incorporating Cerberus into the more-
resilient four-phase design of HotStuff can sharply reduce the need for multi-shard view-changes
in OCerberus (at the cost of higher per-transaction latency).
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